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THE DEBATE ON PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
The latest sterling crisis has raised the prospect of further cuts in 
public expenditure. It is widely believed that expenditure cuts may 
be forced upon the Government as a condition of the IMF loan now being 
negotiated, and there is a considerable body of opinion in this country 
which would welcome such a condition being imposed. Controversy about 
the level of public expenditure in the UK, and its significance in the 
country's present economic difficulties, has been continuous during the 
life of the present administration. The purpose of this article* 
is to identify and comment upon the main arguments in this debate. 
Criticism of the present level of public expenditure is based on a 
number of distinct, though not unconnected views of its economic and 
social significance. One such view, which is of a different character 
to the others considered in this article, has emphasised the overloading 
of government and the consequence of this overloading on, for example, 
expenditure control. Rising expectations of public services - often 
induced by competitive bidding between political parties - have led to 
a massive increase in the economic and administrative responsibilities 
of government and its supporting bureaucracy, to a degree that control 
of the level and direction of public sector expenditure cannot be 
exercised effectively. Since variations in public expenditure are 
an important element in general economic management (particularly in 
what is unhappily described as 'fine tuning'), inability to control 
public expenditure vitiates the principles of conventional demand 
management; to this extent, therefore, the thesis of overloaded 
government has a direct bearing on Britain's current economic problems, 
particularly with respect to anti-inflation policy. 
While convincing, however, this analysis is primarily concerned with 
general and longer-term trends in the role of the public sector and 
the machinery of government, and is less relevant to the specific role 
and implications of the present level of public expenditure in the UK. 
Moreover, although a gradual and permanent retrenchment of public 
expenditure is one possible solution to the overloading problem, this 
kind of analysis is equally concerned with changes in the machinery 
of government administration and control which may be required to 
support an expanded role for the public sector. This school of 
thought, then, is broadly neutral in the present debate. 
This is a shortened preliminary version of a paper on public 
expenditure in the UK by the author and Professor Guy Peters. 
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A more specific line of attack on public expenditure is that its 
steady - and, in the last three years, rapid - increase has diverted 
resources from the important areas of investment in manufacturing 
industry, and exports. This argument formed the major theme in a 
series of Sunday Times articles (and subsequently a book) by Bacon 
and Eltis*, and is frequently expressed in the pages of the financial 
press. Hints of this attitude are to be found at a more official 
level; the recent White Paper on Public Expenditure 1974-79 claimed 
that public expenditure had risen from 42% of GDP in 1960 to about 
60% in 1975, and that while public expenditure rose by 20% in volume 
terms between 1972 and 1975, output in the economy rose by only 2% 
in the same period (Cmd, 6383, p.l). Though it does not actually 
say so, there is a clear implication that this rise in public 
expenditure was at the expense of alternative uses of the resources 
available. 
Clearly, if the volume of public expenditure grows at g% per annum 
for a decade, and other categories of expenditure grow at r% per 
annum, and g is greater than r, the ratio of public expenditure to 
GDP will be higher at the end of the decade than at the beginning. 
However, there is no direct evidence to suggest that if the rate 
of growth of public expenditure were reduced, the rate of growth 
of other expenditure would rise by an amount sufficient to absorb 
the available resources, other than the elegant but empirically 
doubtful prescriptions of neo-classical economics. Except possibly 
in 1973, it is difficult to think of any period in recent British 
economic history when, by bidding away resources, the public sector 
has curtailed the rate of growth of exports or investment. The low 
rate of post-war growth in British manufactured output and investment 
has been attributed to a variety of factors, including the economic 
policies of successive governments, but the resource claims of rising 
public expenditure have not been convincingly established as one of 
them. To be sure, a higher level of public expenditure, financed 
by taxation, has affected the distribution, and may have affected the 
level of private consumption expenditure, but the issue at stake is 
not the balance between private and public consumption, but the allocation 
of resources between consumption (whether private or public) and 
investment and exports. With the present level of unemployed resources, 
it is simply not creditible to assert that public expenditure prevents 
resources being diverted to the production of exports or capital goods. 
It is of course possible to argue that a longer-term view of rising 
R. Bacon and W. Eltis, Britain's Economic Problem: Too Few 
Producers, MacMillan, 1976. 
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public expenditure might support the 'resource-diverting thesis. 
This is not strictly germane to the present debate, but in any case 
there is also little statistical support for it. Excluding transfer 
payments, the ratio of public expenditure to GDP did not change very 
much during the 1960's, and the UK experience with respect to the 
public sector is similar to that of other industrialised countries 
(see below), most of whom enjoyed high rates of output and investment 
during this period. 
One suspects that the argument about the alleged effects of public 
expenditure on resource allocation stems from a belief that public 
expenditure is "too high", though there is no conventional economic 
wisdom, or even rule of thumb, to suggest when such a level is 
reached. To lend some perspective to their view, however, a recent 
paper by Neild and Ward* demonstrates that, in comparison with eleven 
other European countries, the UK had in 1973 the lowest ratio of 
public expenditure to 6NP, and more recent data, though not on a strictly 
comparable basis, do not suggest any significant change in this ranking. 
This and more detailed comparative data, show that the prevailing level 
of public expenditure cannot be advanced as a unique phenomenon which, 
either through its effects on the general level of taxation, or the 
pattern of resource allocation, explains the UK's particular economic 
difficulties. Moreover, the ratios of public expenditure to GNP or 
GDP which are usually quoted in support of the argument that expenditure 
is intolerably high include transfer payments (social benefits and 
various subsidies and grants), which do not represent a claim on real 
resources by the public sector (though of course they figure in the 
tax burden on individual taxpayers). Thus in 1975 public authorities' 
real expenditure on goods and services amounted to about 38 of GDP 
at factor cost (Slue Book, 1976), as distinct from approximately 60 
when current transfer payments are included. The former includes 
expenditure on defence, law and order, health, education, environmental 
services and infrastructure expenditure. Comparatively, real public 
expenditure in the UK is also low by European standards and, absolutely, 
it is not evident that outlay on these public services absorbs an unduly 
high proportion of total resources in a modern economy (modern, at 
least in its aspirations). Nor is there any convincing evidence that 
voters' preferences would demonstrate any significant shift in tne 
relative shares of public and private consumption. 
A more convincing reason for the present unease over the level of 
and Torry Ward, "Toe ouoo--- on'o 
f Capicrodgo, Dopartmnt of Ayrld_o 
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public expenditure stems from the dramatic changes in the burden of 
taxation in the last three years. While public expenditure has risen 
in volume (particularly expenditure on social services and industrial 
and regional aid), aggregate output has remained static and, more 
recently (1975-76) has fallen. It is one thing to pay a higher relative 
tax bill out of a higher real income, and quite another to pay higher 
taxes out of a fixed or falling real income. This unpleasant experience 
has been exacerbated by the structure of UK taxation, and by inflation. 
In the current fiscal year, estimated receipt from personal income 
taxation and social insurance contributions account for over fifty per 
cent of public sector receipts, while VAT accounts for about 12% and 
corporation tax 7%. Taxation is therefore heavily dependent on direct 
taxation of personal incomes, and its effects are immediately and 
painfully obvious to the individual taxpayer. In addition, rapid 
inflation without compensating changes in tax allowances and tax bands 
has brought about a sudden and dramatic shift in marginal and effective 
rates of taxation for most taxpayers, as well as bringing into the 
taxable income range a large number of low income households. In 
1976, for example, a married man with two children under eleven years 
of age, and with average male earnings, will pay almost 25% of his 
income in tax and social insurance, compared with 10% in 1966. For 
a man on three times average earnings, the corresponding figures are 
38% and 23%. Those on two to three times average earnings or over 
have also seen their real incomes eroded as a consequence of the 
flat-rate limits on wages and salary increases contained in the social 
contract. 
Whether or not these marked changes in the level and distribution of 
personal taxation are equitable, their conjunction with stationary 
or falling real output in the economy have proved painful, and their 
effect has found expression of criticism of the level of public 
expenditure. Though understandable, however, this criticism does 
not substantiate the claim that reductions in public expenditure are 
a necessary condition for economic recovery. 
Though often couched in more sophisticated terms, the most important 
and substantive criticism of the trend and level of public expenditure 
since 1974 derives from conventional views on aggregate demand 
management, with on this occasion the added complication of the relation 
between the public sector deficit, the money supply and the rate of 
inflation. As the Fraser Institute's first Quarterly Economic 
Commentary pointed out (I,I, July 1975): 
"The reaction of the UK to external events [the oil crisis and its 
consequences'] has been almost unique .... So far from deflating ., . 
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the Government has actually continued to inflate the level of 27.7? 
domestic demand. This has of course merely postponed the painf.il 
readjustment .... the longer effective action is postponed, tne mo 
likely it is that its timimg and content will be determined by 
considerations of foreign confidence. <; 
A major component of this growth in aggregate demand was public sector 
expenditure which, as already pointed out, rose rapidly in volume terms 
through 1973-76. This policy might have proved feasible, if 
imprudent, had it been accompanied from the start by strict control 
over money wages, higher taxes to reduce the public sector deficit 
and a managed depreciation of sterling to close the deficit in the 
balance of payments. In practice, of course, each of these necessary 
adjustments has taken place, or is taking place - real wages are being 
cut, effective taxation has risen sharply, and sterling has depreciated. 
As we predicted, however, the adjustment has been more painful, longer 
delayed and more subject to external events than if effective action, 
including tighter control over public spending, had been exercised 
during 1974. Instead, money wages were allowed to increase at a rate 
which temporarily maintained real consumption expenditure, and the 
difference between output and expenditure was financed by overseas 
borrowing; similarly the Government failed to pursue a consistent 
policy towards the depreciation of sterling, resulting in periodic 
sterling crises and a substantial cost to the reserves. 
It is tempting to conclude that a sharp cut in the level of public 
expenditure would compensate for these earlier vacillations in policy. 
A decisive cut in public spending would be the simplest and most direct 
means of attack on the two problems of the balance of payments (through 
the fall in aggregate demand), and inflation (thouqh the causal 
mechanism here is less certain). However, those who advocate such a 
policy must be prepared to face its consequences for unemployment.: cuts 
of around £lbn in public spending would certainly push the level of 
unemployment above 2 million during 1977. Even with the recovery 
expected in private investment, it is difficult to envisage an expansion 
in output sufficient to make much impact on this level of unemployment 
for at least two years. 
The alternative being pursued by the authorities is to maintain the 
level of public expenditure and to throw the burden of adjustment on 
private consumption. Simultaneously, they have tried to soften the 
impact of lower output on employment by engineering a fall in real 
wages. The real trade-off in the social contract is not so much 
between money wages and inflation (important though this is) but 
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between wages and employment. Meanwhile,as lower incomes help reduce 
the balance of payments deficit, and the rate of growth of public 
expenditure is cut back, it is hoped that current levels of unemployment 
will be reduced by expanding exports and investment expenditure. 
In principle this is a feasible alternative strategy, though it is 
inevitably more difficult to implement than the traditional policy of 
reducing aggregate demand (and employment) by cutting both private 
and public spending. On existing policies, the balance of payments 
deficit is expected to be eliminated by 1978, and inflation is expected 
to fall by that year to a level comparable with other industrialised 
countries. 
In practice there are serious doubts about the likely success of this 
policy, for two main reasons. First, it is considered unlikely that 
the authorities can restrain the growth of money incomes, following the 
end of the present phase of constraint, to the extent necessary to 
effect a further fall in real incomes. Secondly, it is argued that 
the magnitude of the public sector deficit is inconsistent with the 
level of aggregate demand required to eliminate the balance of payments 
deficit, even if money wages are kept down to their present rate of 
increase. Moreover, to the extent that the public sector deficit is 
financed by short-term borrowing from abroad, or from the bank sector 
it is asserted to be inflationary. Recent measures to restrict credit 
by raising the minimum lending rate, and calling in special deposits, 
are designed to counter these inflationary pressures by restricting 
the growth in the money supply, though at the risk of retarding the 
recovery in industrial output. 
To those reared on the prescriptions of Keynesian economics, a public 
sector deficit during a period of recession is a logical feature of 
counter-cyclical demand management. Moreover, sizeable deficits 
have been experienced by other developed countries. However, based 
on the concept of the full employment budget (i.e. expected public 
sector receipts and expenditure at a full employment level of GNP), 
somewhere between one quarter and one third of the current UK deficit 
can be attributed to the decline in net tax receipts resulting from the 
difference between actual and full employment GDP. A further proportion 
of the deficit can be attributed to increased aid to industry, but at 
least half can be argued to represent an excess of expenditure over 
taxation which cannot be attributed to the recession, and must be 
either reduced, or balanced by a similar reduction in private 
consumption expenditure. 
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In reality the pressures to cut public spending, though founded on 
genuine doubts about the effectiveness of current policy, owe less 
to a careful evaluation of its logic than to a judgement, based on 
the dreary record of Britain's economic performance, about the 
longer-term possibilities for the UK economy and the political will 
of Government to carry out the necessary policies. On paper, the 
collateral offered by North Sea Oil should offer enough guarantee 
to facilitate foreign borrowing on a scale sufficient to make the 
necessary adjustments. However, there does seem to be belief that 
the UK has a unique facility for throwing away such an opportunity. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the public sector deficit should not have 
been allowed to grow to its present level, it cannot be proved that 
the level of public expenditure, or even the public sector deficit, 
necessarily prevents the targets of reducing inflation and eliminating 
the balance of payments deficit being achieved. The necessary 
corollary, however, is that real incomes must continue to fall -
involving a further year's strict control over money wages - and the 
growth in money supply must be tightly constrained. As additional 
support, price controls should be relaxed to allow prices and profit 
margins to rise, and subsidies to nationalised industries, on 
foodstuffs and on housing should be cut (which will also reduce public 
expenditure). 
Whether this additional squeeze on real personal disposable income 
is desirable - as opposed to cuts in public expenditure and higher 
unemployment - or politically feasible, is a matter of opinion, 
rather than economic reasoning. In his next budget, the Chancellor 
will almost certainly face demands for adjustments in tax allowances 
and tax gradations to compensate for the effects of inflation on the 
burden of personal taxation. In terms of the current government 
strategy, a net reduction in taxation must be ruled out, but it would 
be feasible to affect reductions in personal taxation with an increase 
in VAT, which could provide some psychological relief to taxpayers 
at an important phase of incomes policy. 
